SEC NO-ACTION LETTERS: INFORMAL ADVICE
AS A DISCRETIONARY ADMINISTRATIVE
CLEARANCE
Wmituj

J. LocKHART*

The Secuiities and Exchange Commission has long encouraged its.staff to provide
to the public written advice about the need to comply, or means of complying, with
the registration obligations of the 1933 Securities Act. Typically, that advice is
provided in the form of so-called "no-action letters," in which the staff advises a
stockholder, upon inquiry, whether it would recommend Commission enforcement
action if he should sell his stock, without prior registratioi, under the circumstances
and in the manner proposed by the stockholder. The term is used loosely here to
refer to all staff responses determining "no-action" requests-denial as well as
approval of no-action positions.
Though neither statute nor regulation imposes an 6bligition to render no-action
advice,2 the no-action process has become a major staff function, particularly in
the Division of Corporation Finance, which processes most of the no-action letters
issued by the SEC staff.
The no-action process is performed primarily by informal written exchanges
between staff and applicant, results in determinations based upon staff-developed
interpretations and policies as well as upon discretionary consideration of the
applicant's circumstances, and significantly affects the financial condition of
applicants with little or no opportunity for agency or judicial review. For these,
reasons, in searching for wisdom about informal and discretionary functions of
federal agencies, the Informal Action Committee of the AdminiStrative Conference of the United States made an extensive investigation of the no-action process
as administered in the Division of Corporation Finance of the SEC. This article
examining those discretionary processes is drawn largely from the author's report
as a consultant to the Informal Action Committee 3
*Professor of Law, University of Utah.
1 15 U.S.C. § 77; 3 Loss, SECugrriES REGuLAnoN 1894-99

(2d ed. I961); COMMISSION

ON

OnGAseZATION or TiE.ECtTVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNmENT, TASM FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVIcES
AND PROCEDURE 189 (1955).

' Regulations merely inform applicants of the availability of the advisory process and the manner
in which requests for advice should be submitted. 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.81, 202.1(d), 202.2 (Supp. 197);
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5127 (Jan. 25, 1971) CCH FaD. SEc. L. REP. 66,481.1o (describing
procedure and form for no-action requests).
BAdministrative Conference of the United States, Report of the Committee on Informal Action in
Support of Recommendation No. 59 ("SEC No-Action Letters Under iBection 4 of the Securities Act of
1933"), by William . Lockhart, consultant, in I ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF TBE UNITED STATES,
RECOUMFENDATIONS AND REPORTS 440 (January 8, 1968-June 30, 1970). [Hereinafter cited as REPoxr.]
For a study of the no-action process based on currently available, published copies of no-action
requests and responses and reaffrming most recommendations of the Report, see Lowenfels, SEC No-Action
Letters: Some Problems and Suggested Approaches, 71 CoLTIm. L. REV. z256 (1971).
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The staff of the Division of Corporation' Finance in 1968 reported that it generated no-action letters at a rate of approximately 5000 per year, constituting approximately eighty per cent of all no-action letters generated by the entire SEC staff.4
The objective of about four-fifths of the no-action letters rendered by the Office of
Chief Counsel of the Division is to advise stockholders who have received unregistered
stock whether they must register it before selling or risk SEC enforcement action.
Both oral and written advice on that problem are given by the Chief Counsel's
office. Oral advice tends to be general and interpretive; it assists counsel in identifying
specific problems, often with a view to a more specific application for a no-action
letter. Written advice in most cases is specific and conclusory; it includes little
or no interpretive material but expresses the staff's conclusion whether, on a particular set of facts, it would recommend that the Commission take action if a stockholder should sell stock without registration.
The assurance provided by a no-action letter is treated as binding by the Commission, though the estoppel effect of such a letter has not been judicially determined. 5 Such an assurance may also tend to discourage private lawsuits based on
sales made without registration. However, because the no-action letter is founded
upon carefully constructed factual representations, it is not regarded by enforcement personnel as a bar to investigations of unregistered sales until it is determined
that the sale in question conformed to the factual representations.
I
Tim SUBsTANTIV CoN xT
This study of the no-action process in the Division of Corporation Finance (the
"Division") was completed before the recent adoption of Rule i.' The Commission
'Staff Memorandum to Warner W. Gardner, in REPoaT, app. E.
53 L. Loss, SEcu'rns REGULATION 1843-44 (2d ed. 1961). But see United States v. Anzelmo, 319
F. Supp. iio6, 1117 (E.D. La. 1970).
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5098 (Oct. 29, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sno.

L. R-s.
77,921, announcing a policy of public availability of no-action letters cautioned that "[i]t
should be recognized that no-action and interpretative responses by the staff are subject to reconsideration and should not be regarded as precedents binding on the Commission"
The collateral effect of a no-action letter occasionally has an impact upon litigation: e.g., in determining the obligations of a transfer agent to record shares in the name of the acquiring stockholder.
See, e.g., Donlon Ventures, Inc. v. Avien, Inc., x58 N.Y.L.J., No. 5, p. io, [1966-67 Decisions Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 91,96i (1967). And in a recent case the defendant's disregard of
a staff letter declining to take a no-action position may have played a role in determining the willfulness
of his violation, according to a staff attorney in the Division of Trading and Markets. See United States
v. Wolfson, 269 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), af'd 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. x968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 946 (1969); United States v. Wolfson, 282 F. Supp. 772 (S.D.N.Y. x967), ret'd & rem'd, 437
F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1970).
SRule 144 was proposed as alternative to the recommendations of the Disclosure Study, note 14
zinfra, in SEC Securities Act Release No. 5087 (Sept. 22, 1970), [197o-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fan.

-SEc. L. REP.

77,909. A revised proposal was publisbed in SEC Securities Act Release No. 5186 CCH

-Special Report, No. 387, Extra ed., Sept. 15, 1971 (Sept. io, 197); and the Rule was adopted after
-further revisions in SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. xi, 1972), [197X-1972 Transfer Binder]
,CCH FED. Sac. L. REs.
78,487, effective April 15, 1972. [Hereinafter cited as Release 5223.] The

iRule provides an exemption from "underwriter" status (see discussion in text at notes X2-31
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hopes, by that rule, to provide objective standards that will resolve many of the
substantive uncertainties that prompted no-action requests and to reduce the burden
of the no-action process 7 Despite adoption of that rule, however, an understanding
of the substantive context which prompted the demand for no-action letters-as well
as the adoption of Rule i44-is essential to an understanding of the informal exercise
of discretion in the no-action process. Further, that understanding may be necessary to understand the likelihood of continued demand for interpretive letters to
clarify the application of Rule 144!
The substantive problems resolved by the no-action process in the Division prior
to Rule 144 were basically concerned with two aspects of the single question of
whether the 1933 Act9 requires that an applicant's stock be registered before sale:
(I) whether the registration provisions are applicable to the applicant's proposed
sale of stock, and (2) whether the applicant is relieved of the registration obligations
by various exemptions created by statute and rule.
The basic purpose of the 1933 Act is to assure that public distributions of securities
are accompanied by disclosure of all information material to a prospective stockholder's investment decision. The disclosure objectives are accomplished through
the registration and prospectus delivery requirements of section 5 of that Act, which
apply to any "sale" or "offer to sell" of a "security."1 Failure to comply with those
sales of unregistered stock by control persons and others who acquired their stock from the issuer, provided sales are made under prescribed terms and conditions.
78,487 supra
'SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 1I, 2972) CCH Fa. SEC. L. REs.
note 6, announcing adoption of Rule 144 and analyzing the new rule, states at 1a:
"The staff will not issue no-action letters with respect to resales of securities acquired after the
effective date of the rule, but would issue interpretative letters to assist persons in complying with the
new rule. In connection with securities acquired prior to the adoption of the rule, the staff would continue to issue no-action letters."
It is not clear whether the above withdraws the explicit invitation to broker-dealers to seek staff
advice respecting the applicability of the 1933 and 1934 Acts to the sale of particular blocks of securities,
as set forth in SEC Securities Act Release No. 5168 (July 7, 1971) CCH FED. Sac.L. REP. 22,760.
'Examples of potential problems which may be resolved by interpretive letters include:
(a) the definition of "affiliate," which turns on a control relationship with the issuer, and leaves
the concept of "control" undefined. It further leaves unclear whether the "issuer," with which the
"affiliate" shares a control relationship, refers to that term as it is defined in section 2(11) of the
X933 Act, thus including a second level of control-that is, affiliates of persons in a control relationship
with the issuing company.
(a) the "brokers' transactions" by which sales are permitted under Rule x44. These are defined
to require that the broker not be aware "of circumstances indicating that the person for whose account
the securities are sold is an underwriter with respect to the securities." SEC Securities Act Release No.
5223, at ii

(Jan. ix,

1972).

That definition seemingly reincarnates the mystique of "a view to dis-

tribution" which the rule is designed to avoid. The impression is furthered by the following comment
in the explanatory portion of SEC Securities Act Release, at 13:
"In view of the objectives and policies underlying the Act, the rule shall not be available to any
individual or entity with respect to any transaction which, although in technical compliance with the
rule, is part of a plan by such individual or entity to distribute or redistribute securities to the public.
In such case, registration is required."
I Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (970).
"Rule 144, however, is based, in part, on the view that adequate public information is available
without registration where the issuer has, for at least 90 days, been in compliance with the reporting
requirements of the 1934 Act or has otherwise made certain specified information publicly available.
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-requirements may subject the seller to the Commission's injunctive remedies under
section 20 of the Act, the absolute liability to purchasers provided by section 12(I),
and possible criminal remedies under section 24. In addition to those sanctions, a
broker-dealer who participates in a sale of unregistered securities is subject to a
range of sanctions including censure and denial, suspension, or revocation of his
broker-dealer registration.'
In order to exempt regular trading transactions by persons not involved in
promoting the sale of a security, persons other than an "issuer, underwriter or
dealer" are exempted by section 4(I) of the Act from the registration and prospectus
requirements of section 5. A further exemption, also to protect ordinary trading
transactions, is given to dealers or brokers, provided they are not participating in a
general public distribution of the issuer's stock." Because a liberal application of
these exemptions would defeat the disclosure objectives of the Act, the Commission
and staff have sought to limit their availability.
A primary means by which the Act reaches general public distributions of
securities is by excluding an "imderwriter" from the section 4 exemption and by
broadly defining that term. Thus, one who falls within the statutory definition of
"underwriter" must comply with the registration and prospectus requirements of
the
Act. "Underwriter" is defined, in' section z(ii) of the 1933 Act, as
any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for
ai issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates or has
a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking, or participates or has a
participation in'the direct or indirect underwriting of any such undertaking; but
such term shall not include a person whose interest is limited to a commission
-from-an underwriter or dealer not in excess of the usual and customary dis- tributors' or sellers' commission. As used in this paragraph the term "issuer"
shall include, in addition to an issuer, any person directly or indirectly con. trolling or controlled by the issuer, or any person under direct or indirect common
control with the issuer.13
-

The interpretation and application of the "underwriter" definition is the interpretive problem presented by the bulk of the requests for no-action letters received
by' the Division. And the interpretive problem most frequently encountered conecerns the application of the phrase "with a view to ... distribution," which is generally acknowledged to import an extremely subjective test of "underwriter" status.
Thus, the recent Disclosure Study conducted by the SEC staff under direction of
former Commissioner Wheat, after analyzing the disclosure policies effected by the
the 1933 Act, commented:
[T]he Commission and those affected by the '33 Act soon found themselves tied
to a wholly subjective test by which to determine when a person is an "underwriter." Does the person who buys from the issuer or controlling stockholder
"1 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(5) & (7) (197x).
"2 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7 7(d)( 3 ) & (4) (97).
"'Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (I) (1971).
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have his
thetrue
"view"
or "intent"
of later reselling
his securities
to the public? How
can
"intention"
be accurately
determined?

Although the Disclosure Study condemns the subjective quality of these tests and
their accompanying uncertainty, it is clear that the main dimensions of the interpretive
positions taken by the staff are supported by judicial interpretations of the sections
in question.' 5
The following paragraphs illustrate some of the typical interpretive problems
to which the 1933 Act, prior to the recent adoption of Rule 144, gave rise and particularly the magnitude of the uncertainties which generated no-action requests.'
Much of the "law" reflected here has been displaced or modified by Rule I44 but is
an essential background to the operation! of that rule and to the exercise of discretion
in the no-action decision-making process.
(i) X Company issues a noncontrolling block of its stock to A. a director and
controlling shareholder, relying on the exemption from registration provided by
section 4(2) of the 1933 Act for private sales that do not involve a "public offering." A
holds the stock for six months and now seeks to sell it -through,a broker in the
over-the-counter market. If A sells, the staff will ordinarily conclude that he earlier
purchased the security from his company (the "issuer") "with a view to ... distribution" of the security, or that he is "selling for" the issuer "in. connection with"
a distribution. Under either construction, A would be regarded as an "underwriter" who must comply with the registration requirements before selling his
7
stock.
The original sale by X Company to A may also be subject to challenge on the
ground that A's conduct demonstrates that his purchase contemplated a "public
offering," thus compromising the original claim of a private offering exemption.
The determinative question-one of "fact" in the staff's view-is whether A's intent,
at the time he took the stock, was to hold for investment or to distribute the stock.
Even though A, at the issuer's insistence, may have executed a letter reciting his
"investment intent" at the time he took the stock, the staff may conclude that the
latter sale is a more reliable indication of A's earlier state of mind. Hence, the staff
8
would deny a request for a no-action letter.'
" U.S. SECRuimTS & ExCIHNGE Comr. DiscLosuR To INvEsroRs--A RE
ISrTRATVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS 163 (1969).

PPRmAsAL oF FEaD

.&z A.UzN-

[Hereinafter cited as DiscLosuax STUDY.]

" See generally, J. JENNINGS & H. M~str, SEcmura's REGILATION 271-363 (2d ed. 1968).
" For a more detailed description of the interpretive uncertainties that arise from the subjective tests
traditionally applied, see DIscLosuRE STUDY 164-77.
'SEC Securities Act Release No. 4445 (Feb. 2, 1962) CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 3090o.I; 4845.835;
22,753-759 [may be found in U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM., CoimrnroN oF RELEAs DEAUNG
wrrH Mrmas FEQUEmTY AMsmio UNDER THE SEcuRiTIEs Acr OF 1933-44 (1965)] [hereinafter
cited as Release 4445]; SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962) .CCH FDm. SEC. L. REP.
2770.83; 47,341.14 (CoMs'ns-nox, supra at 49) [hereinafter cited as Release 4552]; SEC v. North
Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 28o F. Supp. io6, 121-22 (SD.N.Y. x968), aff'd, 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir.
1970); In re Ira Haupt & Co., 23 S.E.C. 589, 596-99 (1946). But see example (5), infra, under former
Rule 154.
" Release 4552.
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Finally, A's control relationship, though suggesting a motive to distribute on
behalf of his company, is not essential to the above-described application of the Act.
Thus, a noncontrolling shareholder who acquired a noncontrolling block of shares
in similar circumstances may also be viewed as having acquired the shares with
the forbidden intent or "view to ... distribution"; and a large number of no-action
letters present just such circumstances.' 9
(2) A, in the above example, makes a further "private offering" of a noncontrolling block of X Company stock to a friend, B, who owns no other shares
in X Company. B buys the stock with a representation of his investment intent,
holds the stock for six months and then seeks to sell through a broker in the overthe-counter market. Section 2(IX) provides (only for purposes of that definition of
"underwriter") that an "issuer" includes one in a "control" relationship with the
issuer. Hence, A, a controlling shareholder of X Company, is an issuer and B may
be an underwriter if he bought from A "with a view to ... distribution" rather
than investment.20 Again, the deteminative "fact" is B's state of mind at the time
of his purchase from A. If he should request a no-action letter, the staff would
conclude that his sale after holding only six months demonstrates that he did not
have sufficient investment intent at the time of his purchase.' But if B suffers a
severe financial setback that was not foreseeable at the time of purchase, that
"change of circumstances" may support the inference that he bought for investment,
despite his present desire to sell.22
(3)In example (i), a broker who executes a sale of A's stock will want to determine whether A is a so-called "controlling person" of X Corporation, and hence
an issuer under the underwriter definition. If A is a controlling person, then the
broker will be "selling for" an issuer and, under the definition, will be an underwriter. 23 The staff considers the question of control to be one of "fact," which must be
determined by an analysis of all the circumstances and relationships between the
person in question and the company and other controlling persons. 24
(4)In examples (i) and (2), a broker who executes sales of stock for A or B
will want to know whether either is an underwriter: whether B took from A "with
a view to .. . distribution," or whether A took from the issuer with such intent.
If that is the case, then, under section 2(11) of the 1933 Act, the broker may also
"Id.
See also Release 4445; Disc.osuan Sruy x6-62.
0
DISCLOSURE SrUmY 6xr-62; SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 280 F. Supp. xo6, 121-22

(S.D.N.Y. x968), aff'd, 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970); Israels, Checklist For Broker-DealerInquiry As To
Customer's Control or Underwriter Relationship; Or Where Sale of Securities Proposed In Brokerage
Transaction In Reliance Upon S.E.C. Rule z54, x8 Bus. LAw. 94 (1962).
21Re: The Crowell-Collier Publishing Co. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, x957)
CCH FED. Smc. L. REP. % 265.15; 285o.25; 2850.81 (Compilation, supra note z7, at r3); Release 4552;
PRAC7TCING LAW INsrrrr, TRA scawR or PL FoRum oN SEC Io?,RcEms op CONTROLLING STo0=HO11IERS AND IN UNDERWRI-INGS 27-31, 61-62 (C. Israels ed. 1962).
" Release 4552.
"Release 4445; SEC Securities Act Release No. 5168 (July 7, 1971) CCH FED. Src. L. REP. 22,
76o [hereinafter cited as Release 5168]; PLI FoRum, supra note 21, at 5s.
"See 2 L. Loss, SEeumiuEs REG uLArION 770-83 (2d ed. i96).
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be an underwriter if he "participates or has a direct or indirect participation in" a
sale by one who is a statutory underwriter. To avoid a charge (under section
15 (b) (5)
(D) or (E) of the 1934 Act) of willful violation of the Act and the accompanying possibility of disciplinary action,2 5 he should conscientiously investigate
any facts which suggest that his seller occupies such an underwriter status.2 6
(5)In all examples, it is possible that the seller or broker might also want to
determine whether the proposed sale constitutes a "distribution" of the X Company stock. Section 2(I) of the 1933 Act, in defining "underwriter," imposes that
status only where there is a "view to . .. distribution" or where a transaction is
consummated "in connection with . .. the distribution" of a security. The term
"distribution" has always been regarded by the Commission "as essentially synon27
ymous with public offering."
In defining the narrow exemption provided by section 4(4) of the 1933 Act for
"brokers' transactions" on behalf of controlling persons, the Commission, by rule,
defined a "distribution" to exclude "transactions involving an amount not substantial in relation to the number of shares or units of the security outstanding and
the aggregate volume of trading in such security." The rule permits brokers' sales
(for controlling persons) within certain quantitative limitations by excluding such
sales from the definition of the term "distribution"; but that use of the term is
applicable only for purposes of the exemption for brokers' transactions. 8 Thus, the
broad statutory concept of "distribution," embracing any public sale, would be
applicable to the term as it is used in the "underwriter" definition. And sales by
a controlling person of stock privately acquired from the issuer, unless otherwise
exempt, would involve a distribution, rendering both the seller and the broker
statutory underwriters.
(6) Although one who sells for an issuing company or for a person controlling
the issuer ordinarily falls within the statutory definition of underwriter, he may
claim exemption under section 4(2) of the 1933 Act, which exempts "transactions
by an issuer not involving any public offering." Under SEC v. Ralston Purina
Co., 9 the fundamental test that determines availability of the exemption is whether
the offeror's relationship to the offerees in the private transaction is such that the
latter "need . .. the protections afforded by registration.""0 But like the other

interpretive problems described above, the question whether a transaction involves
a public offering is viewed as "essentially a question of fact." And that fact question "necessitates a consideration of all surrounding circumstances, including such
2

15 U.S.C. §§78o(b)(5)(D) or (E) (1970).

" Release 4445; Release 5168; SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 28o F. Supp. io6, 126-27
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), afl'd 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970).
'DISCLOSURE STUDy 161-62.
38 SEC Rule 154, 17 C.F.R. 230.154 (1972); SEC Securities Act Release No. 4818 (Jan. 2z, x966) CCH
FED. SEC. L. RaP. 2920. Rule 154 is rescinded by the Release announcing adoption of Rule 144. SEC
Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. I1, 1972) CCHt Fap. Sac. L. REP. 78,478.
'346 U.S. 3I9 (1952).
8
°ld. at 127.
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factors as the relationship- between the offerees and the issuer, the nature, scope, size;
31
type and manner of the offering."
II
TBE

DE MAND FOR
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No ready thesis adequately explains the heavy demand for no-action letters
reflected in the volume of letters generated by the Division 3 2 Applicants have not
been surveyed to determine the motivations which prompted their requests, but inquiry and hypothesis suggest some probable answers.
A partial explanation, of course, lies in the complications, costs, and delays incident to registration of stock for sale, which may be avoided if it is determined
that registration is not required. Yet very nearly 4o/ of the requests appear to be
from nonlawyer stockholders 33 who, presumably, would not be fully aware of the
burdens of registration. And while the remaining 6o% of the requests originate with
counsel, the reasons for that demand are also not readily apparent. Certainly the
determinations of "ultimate fact" involved in deciding whether registration is required are not unlike similar determinations typically made by counsel without
agency assistance in advising clients about proposed transactions. Moreover, noaction letters are sought in the face of some substantial reasons for not doing so.
Staff responses to no-action requests are frequently unfavorable-forty per cent so in
one analysis 3 4 -and are particularly apt to be negative where the availability of an
exemption from registration is for any reason doubtful. 35 Since the proposed transaction might easily have escaped regulatory attention if consumated without approval,
and in view of the modest rate of success, it is apparent that other considerations
prompt the large number of requests. Furthermore, though the usual delay in staff
response to no-action requests is not excessive,36 the delay is undoubtedly substantial from .the viewpoint of applicants anxious to take advantage of a favorable
market opportunity.
Although potential sellers of securities have good reason not to seek no-action
" Release 4552; see SEC Securities Act Release No. 5121 (Dec. 30, 1970)
T 77,943.

CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.

" See text at note 4 supra.
" This data derives from an examination by the author of no-action requests for the months of
March and July, 1969, on file in the SEC Division of Corporation Finance.
"' This rough datum derives from an examination by the author of responses to no-action requests
for the periods Feb. 14-28, 1969, and April I-I8, 1969, a total of 351 letters, on file in the SEC Division
of Corporation Finance.
"' "[T]he big practical limitation upon the utility of 'no-action' requests is the difficulty of getting
a reply from the Commission. The sad truth seems to be that you get 'no-action' letters in the clear
cases but have an awful time getting them-or don't even ask-in the cases where you really need them."
PLI FoRum, supra note 2i, at x9 (comments of Mr. Gilroy).
" See text following note 57, infra. Isracls, in his Checklist for Assuring Broker-Dealers' Compliance

with Restrictions on the Sale of Unregistered Securities, comments that the no-action procedure is
"time-consuming."

H. Wander & W. Grienenberger (eds.), SELECTED ARntCLtS ON FEDERAL SECURTIES

LAw 79 (A.B.A. Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, 1968).
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letters, the continuing stream of applications, may -be explained by a combination of
factors. These include (i) issuers' fears of civil liability to ultimate purchasers of
unregistered securities under section 12(1) of the 1933 Act; (2) broker-dealers' fears
of disciplinary proceedings brought against them on account of sales of unregistered
securities; (3) the enforcement practices of the Commission and staff; and (4) the
unreliability of counsel's advice as an assurance against disciplinary proceedings.
Technically, the absolute liability imposed by section =2(i) of the 1933 Act on
anyone who, without registration, "offers or sells a security" would not appear
to pose a threat to the issuing company as a result of a private placement, for the
violation emanates from a further sale by the recipient. On further consideration,
however, several very real threats to the issuer arise: (i) The Commission may
commence a formal investigation, suspend trading or bring injunctive proceedings,
with serious consequences in the securities market. (2) The ultimate purchaser
may claim extensive civil liabilities on the theory that the sale was made to him
as part of a distribution on behalf of the issuer-a claim that is encouraged by the
statutory definition' of an underwriter as including one who "sells for" the issuer.
(3) The practical financial consequence is enhanced by the prospect that the issuer
may be required to show the potential liability on its balance sheet as a contingent
claim. (4) Though it is more doubtful, it is possible that the original recipient of
the private placement, if held liable to a later purchaser, would be able, in turn,
to recover against the issuer because of the absolute liability imposed by section
12(1). For all of these reasons, it has been traditional for the, issuer in a private sale
to require an investment commitment from the purchaser to protect against a later
sale which may destroy the private offering exemption-an eventuality made more
likely by judicial and administrative construction. To assure that investment commitment, issuing companies are commonly advised to stamp an investment restriction
on the face of the stock certificates issued in a private placement and to issue "stop
transfer" orders to the tranisfer agent, requiring notice to company counsel if the
restricted shares should be presented for transfer to a later purchaser3 7
Similar threats of liability and disciplinary proceedings confront a broker-dealer
who executes a sale found to have been made without exemption and thus in violation
of registration and prospectus requirements. Division personnel uniformly agree
that a large proportion of no-action requests actually originate with broker-dealers.
Even before the 1964 amendments to the 1933 Securities Act, the Commission's
exercise of its power over registration of broker-dealers had impressed upon them
" The Division of Corporation Finance has recently advised that it "will regard the presence or
absence of an appropriate legend and stop-transfer instructions as a factor in considering whether the
circumstances surrounding the offering are consistent with the exemption under Section 4(2) of the Act."
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5121 (Dec. 30, 1970). See Isracls, Some Commercial Overtones of
Private Placement, in H. X'VANDEr, supra note 36, at X25, 129-30, 135-43; Wood, The Investment-Intent

Dilemma in Secondary Transactions, id. at 145, 169-70.
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their vulnerability to sanctions for participating in distributions of securities acquired
through private placements3 8 In a 1962 release, the Commission indicated that dealers
would be held personally responsible for investigating the underlying facts supporting stockholders' claims of exemption, and that they are obliged "to make an appropriate investigation as to who their seller was and not simply to rely upon the
3
opinion of the seller's attorney that no control relationship existed." And in a
1971 release the Commission "reaffirmed" the broker-dealers' obligation to know
their customers and the securities being sold, emphasizing the firms' obligations to
develop effective supervisory procedures.4 °
The 1964 amendments significantly expanded the disciplinary powers of the
SEC, giving it power to proceed against individual registered representatives as
well as against broker-dealer firms, to impose a wider range of sanctions including
censure and suspension, and to prohibit association of named violators with any
broker-dealers. 41 In addition to seeking revocation or suspension of registration
of broker-dealer firms, the Commission has enhanced the effect of such proceedings
by substantial application of its new statutory power to proceed against individuals.
In the fiscal years 1966 through 1969 the Commission instituted such proceedings
2
against a total of 489 individuals.!
Most broker-dealer firms -that are members of a registered exchange or of the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) have established supervisory
procedures designed to minimize the risk of violations by their representatives. The
procedures tend to focus upon a wide range of financial standards and rules designed
to promote "just and equitable principles of trade;" 4 but if carefully followed, they
would generally bring questionable transactions in "restricted" securities to the
attention of supervising officers. It seems more doubtful whether ordinary supervisory procedures effectively control distributions of securities not stamped with an
investment restriction, but there is a growing tendency for firms to establish compliance procedures under a supervising officer designed to focus specifically on
compliance with federal securities acts.
Although the formal training of representatives in matters of federal securities
law is limited,44 the lore of the securities business supplements the formal supers See,

e.g., Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896

(i959); and list of revocation proceedings, e.g., 26 SEC ANN. RE'. 92-r06 (1960).
"Release 4445, COMp'sLATION at 45.
o Release 5168.
"Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 7 70(b)(5)(D), 770(b)(7) (I97). See generally Greene, Reg-

ulation of Entry Into The Securities Badiness, in H. WANDaa, supra note 36 at 487; Sterling, National
Association of Securities Dealers and the Securities Act Amendments of z964, id. at 495.
4232 SEC ANN. R p. 58 (x966); 33 SEC ANN. REP. 77 (1967); 34 SEC ANN. REP. 90 (1968); 35
SEC ANN. REP. 96 (I969).
43 See NAioN'ALx AssocuiroN or Sacuurns DEAI.ERs RULEs oP FAIR PRACTICE § 27 (1970), adopted
1934 Act
pursuant to 1934 Act, §§ 15A(b)(8) & (9), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7 8o-3 (b)(8) & (9) (970),
§ i5(b)(io), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(io) (1971), and Securities Exchange Act Reg. 15b10-4, X7 CP.R.
§ 2 4 0.1 5 bio-4 (Supp. 1972); SEC Securities Act Release No. 5168 (July 7, 1971).
"See, e.g., NATIoNAL AssocwAoN oF SEcuaRsTis DEALaas, NASD TRAINING GuIn 96-113 (x969).
See recommendations for more extensive development of compliance checklists, requirements for internal
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visory structure. Both SEC enforcement personnel and NASD representatives indicate that the availability of the no-action process to clear "investment stock" is
well understood by most representatives. And it seems likely that the lore of
no-action letters is substantially contributed to by typical SEC investigative practices. Though a no-action letter does not assure immunity, investigations are
more likely to focus upon those transactions in which a no-action letter does not
appear in the file. 5 Where an investigator from a regional office is analyzing a
large, questionable distribution, he is likely to inquire why a no-action letter was
not obtained to support the transaction. 6
All of these factors undoubtedly resulted in closer control of unregistered distributions in most broker-dealer firms; and, at least until Rule i44 is fully understood, supervisory or compliance officers are much more likely to insist upon either
a no-action letter or the opinion of reliable counsel demonstrating the availability of
an exemption from registration. However, broker-dealers to whom a proposed sale
of "investment stock" is presented are not encouraged to have confidence in the
opinion of private counsel. Thus, the Commission's comments in a 1962 release emphasized the unreliability of attorneys' opinions as the basis for a daimed exemption
authorizing trading in unregistered securities. Reviewing a case in which reliance
upon the advice of counsel had been held sufficient to insulate certain dealers from
criminal liability for the sale of unregistered stock, the Commission stated that "the
conduct of these dealers did not meet acceptable standards .... It was up to these
dealers to make an appropriate investigation as to who their seller was and not
simply to rely upon the opinion of the seller's attorney . .. ." The release emphasized that it is insufficient for dealers simply to obtain factual representations from
the sellers and submit those representations to an attorney who supplies an opinion
that an exemption is available:
Obviously, an attorney's opinion based upon hypothetical facts is worthless if the
facts are not as specified, or if unspecified but vital facts are not considered.
Because of this, it is the practice of responsible counsel not to furnish an opinion
concerning the availability of an exemption . . . unless such counsel have themselves carefully examined all of the relevant circumstances and satisfied themselves, to the extent possible, that the contemplated transaction is, in fact, not a
part of an unlawful distribution. Indeed, if an attorney furnishes an opinion based
solely upon hypothetical facts which he has made no effort to verify, and if he
knows that his opinion will be relied upon as the basis for a substantial distribution of unregistered securities, a serious question arises as to the propriety
of his professional conduct 7
accounting and oversight of self-regulatory systems proposed in SEC, REPo RTor
AuvwsoRY Commxrra
ou ENPoRciEtmr Poucr AND PRAcTcES, at 14-16, 57-61 (1972).
' Interview with Mr. Ezra Weiss, then Associate Chief Counsel, Division of Trading and Markets,
Securities and Exchange Commission.
4IId.
'7 Release 4445, CmPILA ON at 45-46, discussing United States v. Crosby, 294 F.,d 928 (2d Cir.
196i). See also SEC Securities Act Release No. 568 (July 7, 1971) CCH FE. SEc. L. REP. 22,760,
indicating that any determination that an exemption exists should be made only after the broker-dealer
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Responsible counsel may legitimately feel some trepidation in rendering opinions
based on conclusions of "ultimate fact" about investment intent and involving
extensive potential liability. Until recently, relatively few lawyers had studied or had
experience with federal securities regulation. While a general understanding of
the regulatory theory could be obtained from traditional sources, little material
was available reflecting the concrete application of doctrine to the determination
of investment intent. Thus, until the recent adoption of a policy making no-action
requests and responses -publicly available, 48 those materials were accessible only
through private arrangements among SEC practitioners for the exchange and com
pilation of no-action letters as -they were received. But those compilations were'not
generally accessible to the practitioners most in need of guidance. Furthermore, that
condition prevailed in a legal context in which the Disclosure Study, after analyzing
the substantive inconsistencies, concluded,
In the area of statutory interpretation which is primarily involved, uncertainty

and divergence of practice presently prevail to an unacceptable degree. Greater
certainty and predictability are essential.

Apart from the mere bulk of requests currently faced by the staff, there is a
constant problem in providing reasonably consistent advice. Since the tests with
which the staff must work are subjective, its-reactions in given situations depend,
to a degree at least, on a "feel" of the transaction conveyed by the request for
"no action." Troublesome inconsistency is often the result. Yet that inconsistency,

which exists within a relatively compact staff operating under a single director,
pales in comparison with the inconsistency in advice given by private counsel
as to when and under what circumstances securities sold in private offerings may
be resold. 49

In summary, private offerings have become increasingly popular as a means by
which a company may acquire additional capital or compensate employees without
undertaking the expense of registration. However, -because of the potential liabilities
to subsequent purchasers that may result from the sale of the unregistered stock by
has reviewed the facts relating to acquisition of the shares and an opinion has been obtained from "competent outside counsel having no proprietary interest in the offering .... ." C. complaint in SEC v.
National Student Marketing Corp., [197x-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FEn. Sac. L. REP. 93,36o, directly
charging two law firms with complicity in anti-fraud violations, including failure to advise the Commission of violations.
77,921. [Herein"' SEC Securites Act Release No. 5098 (Oct. 29, 1970) CCH FED. L. REP.
after cited as Release 5098.] The new policy originated with suggestions by Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis which prompted the SEC to request comments "on whether staff interpretative and no-action letters
should be made available to the public." SEC Securities Act Release No. 4924 (Sept. 20, x968) CCH
Fi. SEc. L. RaP. 77,606. The proposal was also encouraged by Recommendation No. 19 of the
Administrative Conference of the United Stat s, adopted by the Conference at its Fourth Plenary Session,
June 2-3, 197o. The text of Recommendation 19 closely follows the conclusions and recommendations
of the Report from which this article is drawn. See note 3, stpra.
Release 5098 contemplates publication of summaries of the more significant no-action letters in the
Commission's News Digest; and a large number of letters have now been published in the current
materials supplied with the CCH and BNA securities'law loose-leaf services. See list of "No-action and
Interpretative Letters" in 4 CCH Fan. SEC. L. REP. 63,201.
"' DiscLosuRm STumY at 152, 176-77.
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the immediate purchaser, the practice of stamping an investment restriction on the
face of the stock certificate has increasingly been followed. That investment restriction may appear to the immediate purchaser to be a legalistic formality until he
attempts to arrange for the sale of his stock through a broker-dealer. Because of the
increasing frequency of Commission disciplinary and enforcement proceedings
against broker-dealers, they' are sensitized to the danger of selling unregistered
"investment stock." When the prospective sale is brought to the attention of a

supervising manager of the securities firm, he will ordinarily refuse to allow any
sale to be executed until he receives a satisfactory opinion of counsel that a valid
statutory exemption is available. Because of the understanding that many counsel
will provide any opinion necessary to facilitate clients' sales, and because of Com-

mission warnings that the opinion of private counsel will not necessarily insulate
against disciplinary proceedings, many broker-dealers will insist upon a no-action
letter unless the stockholder presents an opinion by counsel regarded as reliable.
Further, it is a matter of general lore among broker-dealers and registered representatives that the safe thing to do, in any doubtful case, is to insist upon a no-action
letter. And the investigation and enforcement practices of the Commission staff substantially contribute to that lore, for experience suggests to dealers that, in routine
investigations, much less question is raised about transactions for which a no-action
letter appears in the file.
Finally, where counsel is asked to render an opinion on the kind *of "ultimate
fact" questions involved in determining the availability of an exemption, he may
well conclude that the uncertainty of the interpretive rules, or the unavailability
of a sufficient number of concrete applications, renders it advisable to take advantage of the no-action procedure rather than risk an independent opinion.
These sources of demand for no-action letters suggest some doubt about whether
the demand will diminish. Private offerings continue to produce a significant share
of the total estimated gross proceeds from new securities offered' Undoubtedly,
the rules initiated by the Disclosure Study and culminating with the adoption of
Rule i44" will reduce the uncertainty that prompts many no-action requests. But
because the proposed rules are in some respects more rigidly restrictive, and somewhat uncertain with respect to unregistered sales of stock in nonreporting companies, 2 it seems possible that many transactions that are now executed without
" See SEC estimates of proceeds from private corporate offerings, e.g., $2,o23,789,ooo in private
offerings compared to $S13,288,o56,ooo in registered public offerings in period Jan.-Ap. 1971. Securities
Offerings, Estimated Gross Proceeds from New Securities Offered for Cash in the United States, SEC
STA-TsImcA. BULL., June 1972, Vol. 31, No. 6, at 16.
It is possible that the substantial narrowing of the private offering exemption by SEC v. Continental
Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 ( 5 th Cir. 1972), will ultimately reduce the volume of private offerings and
of related no-action requests. In the shorter run, however, it seems as likely that narrowing of the
exemption may result in an increase in demand for no-action or interpretive letters as counsel seek to
clarify the remaining scope of the exemption.
"1 See note 6, supra, and accompanying text.
" Section (C)(2) of Rule 144, requiring certain information to be "publicly available" does not indicate what manner or extent of publicity will satisfy the rule.
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notice will be more clearly identified as doubtful transactions. This, in turn, may
produce additional wequests for no-action letters, particularly for proposed "private
transactions," which are not redefined by Rule I44. Obviously, this depends upon
what proportion of the existing volume of private transactions are traceable to nonreporting companies.
Other factors may also produce additional demand for no-action letters. A more
successful training program for registered representatives may be developed by the
NASD, making representatives more aware of doubtful transactions, particularly
as a result of the adoption of Rule 144. The expansion of relevant courses in the
law schools and the continuing expansion of practice in that field by inexperienced
lawyers both may add to the flow of requests for no-action letters. Continued
aggressive enforcement and continuing doubt about the protection furnished by
opinions of counsel will continue to induce broker-dealers to seek the security of a
no-action letter where questions arise.
For these reasons, it may be desirable for the Commission, as well as other
agencies, in structuring their advisory processes, to further consider the impact of
enforcement practices, the role of private counsel, and the possibility of avoiding
routine "clearances" in order to give more extensive consideration to questions which
advance their policy and technical thought, with broader availability and fuller exposition of the grounds for their conclusions. Perhaps most of those goals will be
accomplished by the Commission's announcement in connection with its recent
adoption of Rule i44 that it will not issue no-action letters for transactions within
the coverage of the Rule but will continue to issue interpretive letters. 8 Those
letters, like no-action letters,"4 will be publicly available. Thus, the public will at
least have access to a substantial collection of the staff's explanations and applications
of policy. 5
III
50
ORGANzATroN oF THE No-AcTiON PRocEss

The no-action process administered through the Office of the Chief Counsel,
Division of Corporation Finance, is a distinct facet of the organization of that
Division. The Chief Counsel is assisted in administering the process by two
"' Release 5223.
'Release 5098, announcing the policy of public availability, applies to "interpretative" as well as

"no-action" letters.
" Staff "no-action" letters, however, seldom contain an exposition of the interpretative basis for the
conclusion stated. See text at pages 113 & x2o, infra.
"' Much of the information in the following material was obtained by the author from a series of
interviews and examinations of files and records in the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance in x969-70,
and arranged with the cooperation of the Commission and Mr. Philip A. Loomis, Jr., then General Counsel
and recently appointed Commissioner, SEC. Particularly helpful and generous with their time were
Mr. Courtney Whitney, Jr., then Chief Counsel of the Division of Corporation Finance, and Messrs. John

J. Heneghan, William E. Toomey, assistant Chief Counsel, Edmund Shevlin, then Special Counsel, in the
Division of Corporation Finance, and George P. Michaely, Jr., former Chief Counsel of the Division.
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Assistant Chief Counsel (hereafter, "Assistants"), who devote at least seventy-five
per cent of their time to the process. They, in turn, are assisted by approximately
forty staff attorneys from the various sections of the Division who, on the average,
devote slightly more than fifteen per cent of their time to the process. Two or three
special counsel in the office of the Chief Counsel also assist in the process on special
assignments from the Chief Counsel or his Assistants. The Division is organized
into fifteen branches for the primary purpose of processing 1933 Act registration
statements and letters of comment and 1934 Act reports and proxy materials. Each
branch of the Division bears responsibility for processing these materials for an
assigned group of companies, with new companies being assigned to the branches
on a rotating basis. The branch chiefs are responsible to the Director of the Division
for branch performance of these duties.
The no-action process administered by the Chief Counsel's office cuts vertically
through this organizational structure; the staff attorneys in the various branches are
directly responsible to the Chief Counsel's office for their performance. Assignments
to prepare responses to requests for no-action letters are made to the staff attorneys
by the senior Assistant through the branch chief or the senior attorney in the
branch, who attempts to balance the work load.
All requests for advice respecting the need to register stock to be offered for
sale, as well as other requests for information, are channeled from the branches
to the Chief Counsel's office. (Exceptions are occasional calls received by a branch
attorney who has previously dealt with a party or his attorney.) Verbal requests are
generally handled as abstract interpretive questions, with only general guidelines
stated. Conversations looking to submission of a no-action letter may become more
specific in identifying key issues, and verbal disapproval of a proposal may be
offered; but, as a rule, no concrete conclusions approving a course of action are
expressed orally. Where the advice sought involves a request for approval of a
specific course of action, the parties are asked to submit a written statement of all
of the pertinent facts and to request a no-action letter.
All written requests for a no-action letter are initially channeled through the
senior Assistant, who makes a rough appraisal of the problems they present and
assigns them to a branch. (He may occasionally retain a particularly difficult problem or assign it to one of the special counsel in the Chief Counsel's office.) The
letters are assigned to the various branches according to the name of the company
whose stock is to be offered for sale; the branch which has previously dealt with
a company in connection with a prior registration or other matter will be assigned the
no-action letters involving that company's stock. Where new companies are involved, those companies and letters relating to them are assigned to the branches on
a rotating basis.
After the branch chief or senior branch attorney assigns a staff attorney to the
problem, he would ordinarily proceed as follows to handle the matter:
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(i)
(2)

analyze the apparent problems presented by the request;
write (or occasionally call) to ask for a further statement of facts if
essential facts are missing;

(3) conduct a file search to determine:
(a) whether the company has filed a registration statement with the
Commission;
(b) whether the company is registered under the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 and is currently rendering reports to the Commission

pursuant to that Act;
(c) whether the files indicate any securities violations by the companies
or individuals involved, and if so, whether those violations are current;
(d) the current price at which the stock is trading and the current
trading volume, if available; and
(e) whether the essential facts stated in the requesting letter comport
with the information about the company on file with the Commission
(This search generally will involve a rudimentary examination of
the amount of stock issued and outstanding, the relationship of
"control" persons, and a quick search of the general correspondence
file on each company. If possible inconsistencies with the facts stated
in the requesting letter appear, a more thorough search will be
conducted);
(4) do necessary research, if any;
(5) prepare a recommended response and submit it to the Assistant, together
with the requesting letter, and a form reflecting the information obtained
in the file search; and
(6) in a very few cases the branch attorney may be asked to prepare a memo
explaining the reason for his conclusion.
The recommended response, as submitted by the branch attorney, is then
reviewed by one of the Assistants, who signs the letter (under his title) if he finds
it satisfactory. In a large proportion of the cases, however, the Assistant revises the
*recommended letter, often (3o-4o per cent of cases) reversing the conclusion recommended by the staff attorney. In other (ro-2o per cent) cases, he may revise the
form or content of the letter. Where the conclusion is reversed, the practices of
the tywo Assistants diverge: unless the reason for the staff attorney's different conclusion is readily apparent (and reasonable), one Assistant discusses the matter with
-the originating staff attorney -and explains the reason for his different conclusion;
the other seldom discukses the change. In every case, however, the staff attorney
is notified of -the final result by receiving a copy of the responding letter in the
.form in which it was sent.
Where a -no-action request presents a particularly difficult or unusual problem,
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the Assistants may discuss the matter with the Chief Counsel or Director of the
Division before rendering their final determination. In some of those cases, or
where the matter has been extensively discussed between the Chief Counsel and
counsel for the stockholder, the Chief Counsel may sign, or prepare and sign, the
letter. He also prepares some letters from time to time on a regular basis, though
the total number handled by the Chief Counsel is small. One former Chief Counsel
estimated that a relatively small proportion of his time (not more than io-15 per
cent) is devoted -to the no-action process. His predecessor, however, estimated that
he spent closer to half of his time on no-action matters. The disparity is probably
explained by a recent Commission change of procedures designed to minimize the
number of no-action matters brought up for Commission consideration.57
The no-action process appears to be administered on a substantially current
basis. Relatively few cases involving significant delay appeared, and, where delay
occurred, it often resulted from requests that the applicant supply more factual
data. A random sampling of the letters issued in 1969 indicated that approximately
half of the affirmative responses and 70 per cent of the negative responses had been
pending for approximately one month or less, 30 per cent of the affirmative responses
and 20 per cent of the negative responses had been pending for approximately two
months, and an additional 2o per cent of the aflirmative responses and io per cent
of the negative responses had been pending longer than two months. Most of those
pending more than two months had involved some additional correspondence intervening between the request and the concluding response.
The relative currency of the process is undoubtedly due to an effective check-off
process maintained by the senior Assistant. He keeps track of every assignment of
a no-action matter to a staff attorney and prods those who are slow in responding.
While this presents some problem because the staff attorneys'are primarily responsible
to their branch chiefs, the system seems to be operating satisfactorily.

Iv
INITIATION OF THE PROCESS

A. The Parties

As indicated, the applicant for a no-action letter is generally a stockholder who
seeks -to sell his stock without registration. In some instances, the applicant may be
a promoter of a new company, seeking exemption for an initial issue, or a promoter
6f a merger, seeking assurance that the merged company's stockholders may receive
or dispose of the surviving company's unregistered stock. And, occasionally, a
pledgee seeks to realize upon pledged stock by obtaining a no-action letter authorizing
sale. Although many other parties, such as broker-dealers, may be interested in particular transactions, it is not the practice for interested parties to apply or intervene;
See text at page 115,

ihfra.
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and, in view of the substantive questions usually at issue, it seems doubtful that
intervention would serve any purpose.
There are, however, some circumstances where the interests of third parties
appear to affect staff or Commission judgments. For example, in one instance the
Commission appeared to take into account the fear of administration officials that
denial of an exemption and the resultant closing of the applicant's plant (for lack
s
of funds) would produce unemployment in an already depressed area.
While such informal intervention on behalf of applicants by administration
officials appears to be rare, intervention by members of Congress is much more
common. For example, a spot check showed responses to nine inquiries from congressmen during the period of April I-I8, 1969, a period in which 218 no-action
letters were sent. Almost invariably, such an inquiry results in preparation of a
memorandum for submission to the congressman, explaining the circumstances,
the status of the no-action request, and the basic statutory theory supporting the
staff or Commission disposition of the matter. However, intervention by members
of Congress apparently has little effect on the disposition of no-action mattersP °
B. The Form of Advice Sought
Most questions relating to registration obligations are directed to the Chief
Counsel's office in the Division, and that office responds to 75-ioo telephone calls per
week involving requests for interpretive advice. The Chief Counsel and his
Assistants give considerable oral advice about interpretive problems presented by
particular transactions, but most such advice is designed to identify specific problems
which are left for ultimate resolution by counsel. The staff generally will not express
specific conclusions about the legal consequences of specific courses of action without
a written request detailing all pertinent facts. Where the parties seek ultimate conclusions about the application of interpretive concepts to specific facts, particularly
where inquiries relate to the "underwriter" problems that dominate the no-action
process, the parties will be urged to submit a written request for a no-action letter.
In such cases, oral advice will be directed to explaining the kinds of facts that may
be helpful in submitting a no-action request.
At an earlier date, many no-action matters were handled by a conference at
which the applicant's attorney appeared, bearing the form of no-action letter for
which he sought staff approval. The issues presented were debated and often resolved in personal conferences, with the letter issuing immediately. Such conferences now play a considerably less significant role in the no-action process, and
the responding letter is no longer negotiated and executed in the course of the conference. Personal conferences do, however, continue to provide an effective forum
for advocacy on behalf of a particular application, with some apparent effect upon
the outcome in some cases.
:8 See Commission action on no-action request, reversing the staff position, app. B,
' See text at page 127, infra.
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There is no prescribed procedure for recording telephone or personal conferences.
Some attorneys maintain a log of calls while most apparently do not. Where the information provided is material, notes are inserted in the correspondence file and
generally referred to as the basis for factual recitations in a later responding letter.
As might be expected, in view of the clearance function they perform, no-action
letters make up the bulk of letters processed in the Office of Chief Counsel of the
Division. A sampling of 322 letters issued in the period April 1-, 1969, revealed
that 218 were no-action letters in the sense that they merely recited facts and stated
conclusions respecting the obligation to register stock rather than overtly explaining
the basis for the conclusions. Only seven letters in that period provided any detailed
discussion of interpretative problems-but they took no position on enforcement
prospects. The remaining ninety-seven letters were for general administrative or
informational purposes.
V
PROCESSING No-AcnON LxrmRs

A. Defining the Questions to be Answered
The no-action process does not provide any routine method for assuring that
applicants understand the factual and legal questions that may determine the result
of their request. Generally the written requests for no-action letters do not pose the
specific questions to be answered but merely recite facts relating to the amount of
stock held, the source, date and price of the acquisition, and the extent of other
holdings in the same stock, with source, date, and price of those acquisitions. A
survey of the staff preparing responses indicates that the no-action requests expressly
state the determinative legal or interpretive question in about 35 per cent of the
applications. When the applicant identifies the question, however, he is correct (in
the staff attorney's view) in about 8o per cent of the cases.06

Where a request for a no-action letter provides insufficient information, the
staff attorney ordinarily will respond with a written request for additional facts.
That inquiry, however, seldom expressly identifies the questions considered to be at
issue. (And in a large number of routine requests, of course, the questions merely
seek to establish the source of acquisition, the length of the holding period, and
the reason for the present desire to sell.)
More often, a telephone inquiry by the staff attorney or a status inquiry by the
0
' A questionnaire submitted to forty-three staff attorneys in the Division of Corporation Finance.

Probably because of the length and complexity of the questionnaire, only ten replies were received. Five
of the replies were from attorneys who had been handling no-action matters for one year or less,

and three from attorneys with experience of six months or less. On the other hand, four responses came
from attorneys with experience ranging from i Y2. to 3 Y2 years. In view of the relative instability of theforce of attorneys in the Division as a whole, this is probably a satisfactory cross-section.
The entire questionnaire, with a profile of the responses to each question, is set forth as app. I
to Report, supra note 3. The 8o% figure cited in the text is taken from the responses to question 13 of

that questionnaire. Subsequent data drawn from the questionnaire will be cited herein as: Questionnaire,
supra note 6o, question -.
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applicant may result in a telephone or personal conversation which identifies the
key issues. But staff attorneys estimate that in more than half of the cases there
is no communication with the applicant that specifically identifies the determinative
question. 6 In most of those cases, however, the nature of the inquiry is undoubtedly
so routine that the staff assumes that the determinative issue is understood. And in
many of those cases the staff's reasoning is apparent from its comment that it is
unable to grant the request "in view of the short holding period."
The more sophisticated SEC practitioners, on occasion, will provide a full statement of facts, followed by a statement of their interpretive reasoning in support 6f the opinion which they propose to give their clients, concluding with a
request that the Division indicate its concurrence. However, staff conclusions
apparently do not turn on the form of application. Some staff attorneys suggest
that counsel may often want to avoid committing themselves to a single rationale, or
may hesitate to focus attention upon a particular problem.
Although the power to deny a no-action letter would seem to give the staff substantial power to compel modification of proposed transactions, it does not appear that
the power is used extensively. Where discussion initiated by the applicant or hig
counsel focuses on available alternatives, staff attorneys may occasionally suggest
specific modifications of a transaction. And in a few instances the Commission has
suggested that a specific limiting commitment would enable it to authorize a
no-action position. Ordinarily, however, where revisions are made to assure favorable
treatment, the suggestion is offered by counsel for the applicant.
While discretionary factors may often play a substantial role in the staff and Commission decision, few applications address any argument to such matters. Sophisticated SEC practitioners will occasionally point out that the volume of transactions
in the stock in question is sufficient to assure that the market will not be affected
by the sale and that no special commission inducements will be necessary. And the
relative insignificance of the holdings involved, compared to the total stock outstanding, will often be pointed out. But factors such as the difficulty of obtaining
the issuer's agreement to register, or the pendency of enforcement proceedings and
the applicant's relation to those proceedings, are seldom mentioned in the applicant's
letter.
B. Establishing the Facts
No-action advice is usually given hypothetically in the sense that the staff does
not purport to determine questions of evidentiary fact. However, the staff insists that
it will not give no-action advice without a full statement from the applicant of the
facts material to the transaction in question. 2 The letters essentially treat those statements as affidavits, scrupulously referring to or incorporating the factual assertions
:' Questionnaire, supra note 6o, questions x5 and x6.
2
in a recent release outlining the procedure for "no-action" or interpretative letters, the Commission
.emphasized that "letters relating to unnamed companies or persons, or to hypothetical situations, will not
be answered." SEC Securities Act Release No. 5127 (Jan. 25, 1971) CCH FED. SEc. L. Rr-P. 66,48r.o.
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in the applicant's letter. But, with minor exceptions, no proof is required of the
facts asserted by the applicant. This would seem to conflict with the Commission's
own assertion that a "serious question" concerning the propriety of an attorney's
conduct would arise if he "furnishes an opinion based solely upon hypothetical facts
which he has made no effort to verify," knowing that his opinion will be relied upon
to support distribution of unregistered securities.

It does appear that some of the

asserted facts are verified against information available in the Commission's files.
Ordinarily, however, those files would not provide means of verifying the trans-

action by which the shares were acquired unless they were acquired directly from
the issuer. And even that information may be unavailable with respect to nonreporting companies.

It is estimated by the senior Assistant that the facts initially provided by the
applicant are inadequate in about 30 per cent of the cases. In all but about io per

cent of the cases the missing facts can be supplied from Commission files in the
course of a routine check of the issuer's file.64 But in only a negligible number of
cases aie the facts asserted by the applicant materially inconsistent with facts found
in the routine check of the issuer's file.
Though the staff seldom requires substantiation of factual assertions, it may
make routine inquiries where the applicant has not supplied sufficient information
about the source or period of his holdings. And submission of an unaudited statement of the applicant's financial position, both currently and at the time that he
acquired the stock in question, is frequently required. But in exceptional cases,
the staff may require some further substantiation of the applicant's assertions. For
example, an applicant who claims that a medical problem created a serious change
of financial position may be asked to submit a doctor's certification. In other instances, applicants have been required to furnish a cancelled check to demonstrate
the date of purchase of the stock in question or to furnish a copy of an employment
contract on which a claimed "change of circumstances" is based.
C. Research
The available research tools, in addition to those publicly available, include
the following internal sources:
(a) a monthly summary of interpretations which recites the basic facts and
reasoning of the more significant no-action matters passed on each month by the
staff. The summary does not include the text of the related letter, but contains
considerably more explanation of the grounds for the result than do the no-action
letters.
(b) a large card file containing the same summaries of interpretations, in which
"Release 4445; see also SEC Securities Act Release No. 568 (July 7, 1971) CCH

FED.

Sac. L. REP.

=,76o.
" Questionnaire responses suggest that it may be necessary to obtain additional facts from the
applicant in 20-25% of the cases. Questionnaire, supra note 6o, question io.
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the cumulative production of the monthly summaries is filed. The cards are indexed by subject heading and by statutory section, and are cross-referenced to the
significant questions involved in each case summarized.
(c) a file of legal memos ott selected problem areas is maintained in a file alongside the card file. Relatively few memos have been added to that file in recent
times.
(d) "The Bible," an analytical treatise prepared for use and maintenance in the
office of the Chief Counsel which analyzes the construction of each section of the
1933 Act.
(e) a file of Commission minutes which indudes the related staff memos submitted to the Commission explaining the staff conclusions on no-action matters
brought to the Commission for consideration.
(f) a chronological file of all letters and memoranda rendered by the Office of
Chief Counsel, Division of Corporation Finance, which includes all no-action letters
issued.65
(g) a listing of all companies for which Commission files are maintained, with
a classification code keyed to identify companies in which similar disclosure problems were encountered.
The summaries of interpretations are never prepared by the originating staff
attorneys. Rather, they are (or were) prepared by a law student clerk under the
supervision of the senior Assistant. The usual practice is for the compiler, monthly,
to select for summary a group of the more significant no-action letters sent by the
Office. Occasionally letters will have been marked for summary during preparationparticularly those signed by the Director of the Division. From the selected group
of letters, the Assistant Chief Counsel selects those to be summarized. The compiler
summarizes the facts and reasoning underlying the letter and submits the summaries to the Assistant for review and approval. Those summaries are then utilized
both in the card file of interpretations and in the monthly summary sheets distributed
to the staff attorneys.
While the criterion for selection of no-action letters for summary is somewhat
unclear, the general understanding of the compiler is that he is to select the cases
that have "precedential value." However, he is instructed not to prepare cards on
"questions of fact" such as "control" or "change of circumstances," because each
case is viewed as limited to its own facts. On the other hand, he usually selects
most cases which are the subject of Comamission action as reflected in Commission
minutes.
Responses to inquiries with the staff suggest that none of the available internal
research sources are very heavily utilized. Most favored by some staff attorneys
is reference to a personally-complied file of previous no-action letters, which apparently is consulted in somewhat more than half of the cases by those who use
'The no-action letters and interpretive letters have been made available for public inspection and
copying as a result of a recent change of policy. See Release 5098.
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such a file regularly (30 per cent of respondents). Next most frequently relied

upon, in 20-30 per cent of the cases, by less than half of the respondings attorneys, are
personal conferences with other staff attorneys. And the card file of interpretive sum6
maries, running a poor third, is apparently used quite infrequently.
Virtually no research use appears to be made of the monthly summaries of
interpretations that are distributed to all staff attorneys. Apparently this results from
the absence of any indexing system. All of the same information is available in
indexed form in the card file of summaries, but use of the card file requires the
staff attorney to go to the library in the offices of the Chief Counsel.
In considering the relatively infrequent use made by the staff attorneys of the
available internal research sources, it should be remembered that the routine nature
of most of the no-action matters invites little research. Furthermore, the ad hoc and
subjective quality of the typical determinations of "ultimate fact" tend to encourage
the view that conclusions are to be drawn from the facts and not from research.
Thus, though the Assistant Chief Council attempts to promote a view of no-action
matters as legal and interpretive questions, rather than exercises of discretion, it
seems doubtful that that view is generally accepted in the staff. Questionnaire
responses indicate that the less-experienced staff attorneys find their own "reservoir
of experience" sufficient in 7o per cent of the cases, and the more-experienced staff
6
attorneys in almost 90 per cent of the cases. "
D. Review
Internal review of staff responses to no-action requests is the primary responsibility of the two Assistant Chief Counsel of -the Division, and their efforts
in this regard appear to be thorough. Staff attorneys submit a proposed form of
response to one of the two Assistants who, after review and any necessary revision,
sends the letter over his own name and tide. Review by the Assistants appears to
be demanding and results in reversal of the disposition recommended by the staff
attorney in 30-40 per cent of the cases.63 To a large extent, the review process is
viewed as a training opportunity, providing the Assistant Chief Counsel an opportunity to discuss the matter with the staff attorneys wherever the initial draft
suggests misunderstanding or inadequate research.
Unless a specific request is made, applicants are not informed of the staff's conclusion prior to their receipt of the responding staff letter. Therefore, most opportunity for argument arises in the course of the staff attorney's preparation of a recommended response. After receiving a response and upon inquiry (but not in the
0

' Questionnaire, supra note 6o, question 27.
supra note 6o, question 29.
6SQuestionnaire,
8
attorneys apparently consider the rate of reversal to be much lower: slightly less than 5%.
Staff
S
Questionnaire, supra note 6o, question 25. That disparity may be explained, in part, by the fact that
one of the Assistants seldom discusses revisions with the staff attorneys. The other Assistant frequently
discusses the matter with the originating staff attorney, suggesting areas for farther inquiry, without
expressly rejecting the proposed letter. In all instances, however, the originating staff attorney receives a
copy of the letter in final form.
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written response), applicants are advised that they may submit additional facts or
argument for staff consideration. But in a large proportion of the cases (70-90 per
cent), nothing further is heard from the applicant after the response is sent.
No information is volunteered to applicants about the possibility of appealing
staff advice to the Commission," and disclaimers by the staff of authority to speak
for the Commission may lead many applicants to suppose that appeal is unavailable.
However, Commission minutes indicate that it generally undertakes to dispose
authoritatively of those no-action matters brought to it by the staff for consideration" 0
Upon inquiry about the possibility of appeal, an applicant will be advised that he
may request the staff to bring the matter before the Commission; and all such
requests are, in fact, brought to the Commission. However, the applicant is not
invited to appear before the Commission or to make a written submission, and he
is discouraged from requesting an appearance or making a submission in at least
two ways. First, upon asking about the availability of a procedure for taking the
along these lines:
no-action matter to the Commission, the standard response is'
You may request to have your matter brought to the Commission for consideration. This is the procedure: We [the staff] prepare a statement of the
facts and a memo in which we present your position and arguments and the
staff's position and arguments, together with our recommendations to the Commission.
Second, no mention is generally made of an opportunity to appear before the Commission. And where an applicant inquires about the possibility of an appearance,
the standard response is: "You have a right to request to be heard, but such requests
are seldom granted." Generally the staff memo submitted to the Commission in
such matters recommends against hearing the applicant or his attorney, on the
ground that the staff believes he has nothing to add to the arguments submitted on
his behalf by the staff.
Much of the staff resistance to appeals arises from a sense of obligation to
preserve the Commission's time for more important matters. Until recently the staff
had been operating under instructions to bring to the Commission all no-action
matters involving a proposed offering valued at $i million or more. As a result,
though the Commission encouraged the staff not to adhere religiously to that rule,
a substantial number of no-action matters were brought to the Commission at the
instance of the staff in addition to those appeals arising. from an applicant's persistence. However, most cases brought by the staff for Commission consideration
were selected in order to obtain a clarification of policy.
The Commission has recently taken two steps in addition to Rule 144 designed
OR
17 C.F.R. § 2o2.i(d) (SIspp. 197') advises that:
In certain instances an informal statement of the views of the Commission may be obtained. The
staff, upon request or on its own motion, will generally present questions to the Commission which
involve matters of substantial importance and where the issues are novel or highly complex, although
the granting of a request for an informal statement by the Commission is entirely within its discretion.
"0 See text beginning at page xi6, supra.
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to reduce the burden of no-action matters reaching it for review: The "automatic
appeal" rule for matters exceeding $i million has been withdrawn, and the Commission's "duty officer," a single Commissioner on a rotating assignment, has been
delegated the power "to determine whether the Commission should or should not
grant a request for Commission review of a no-action request which had been denied
by the Division.

71

The urge to protect the Commission from an excessive burden of no-action
matters may also be partly responsible for the "cave-in" phenomenon-the staff's
reversing an earlier denial rather than complying with a request for Commission
review. It is difficult to trace concrete examples of that phenomenon, but it is
acknowledged by the senior Assistant that such "cave-ins" occur from time to time
where the staff regards an issue as a "dose question." On the other hand, it has
been asserted that the reason for the "cave-in" may be the staff's reluctance to give
the Commission an occasion for reversing a favored interpretive position. In any
event, the "cave-in" practice is recognized among knowledgeable SEC practitioners
and presents difficult ethical problems. A request for a Commission hearing is
thought to consume the staff's "good will"-with the result that counsel must choose
which clients are entided to deplete his "good will" with the staff.
In most instances, the form of Commission action in reviewing no-action matters
appears to involve an authoritative Commission disposition, effectively constituting
an "order." A typical minute entry relating to a no-action matter may read,
Upon the recommendation of the Division of Corporation Finance, . . . the

Commission denied the request of Mr. A for a "no-action" letter with respect
to his proposed sale of shares of X Corporation common stock and also
denied his request to be heard by the Commission in the matter.
Or in another form,
For the reasons stated in a memorandum dated
, the
Division of Corporation Finance recommended that the "no-action" request
be granted. That recommendation was approved.
While the reasons for the Commission dispositions are seldom reflected in the

minute entries, there is no doubt that the Commission takes specific action on the
particular case brought before it. There is no basis for supposing that it merely gives
general approval or policy direction to an informal staff process which it authorizes
but does not adopt.
An examination of Commission minutes for the period May io, 1967, through
May 14, 1968, revealed that forty-five no-action matters were brought before the
Commission for consideration. It is not apparent how many were brought at the
instance of the applicant, but in nine instances the papers accompanying the submission to the Commission indicated that a request for appearance had been made.
Five cases reflect an appearance by counsel, while four cases expressly reflect the
" Securities & Exchange Commission Minute, May i9,1970.
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Commission's refusal to hear counsel. The dispositions of these no-action matters by
the Commission are reflected in the following chart drawn from a review of Commission minutes and related staff memoranda.72
Period: ioMay 1967-14 May r968
No-action matters before the Commission
Commission reversals of staff recommendations
Reversals of recommended denials of sale
Reversals of recommended approvals of sale
Commission acceptance of recommended denials of sale
Commission acceptance of recommended approval of sale

45
4
I
3
19
20

E. Form of the No-Action Statement
Typically, a no-action letter makes reference to the requesting letter, recites all
of the material facts supplied by the applicant (making reference to the source) or
incorporates the applicant's letter by reference, and states a conclusion. The conclusions of no-action letters typically follow the conclusory and stylized patterns set
forth in Appendix A, providing little or no explanation of the result.
In an effort to reduce the burdens of the no-action process, the Division at
present frequently follows the practice of merely incorporating the applicant's letter
without repeating -the facts. Obviously this practice would make no-action letters
themselves much less useful as precedent, particularly where additional facts may
have been acquired from direct conversations or from internal sources. Some staff
members also suggest that failure to repeat the facts renders no-action letters much
less reliable as a protection for brokers who are asked to execute transactions in the
unregistered stock, for it will be more difficult to satisfy their duty to investigate
their seller.
VI
RELATION OF No-AcnoN LETTERs TO CoMPLIANCE PROGRAMS
Former SEC Chairman Cohen has commented that the no-action process is an
area "where an ounce of prevention is worth ... a pound of enforcement." ' That
view of the compliance benefits of the no-action process is widely held among the
senior administrators on the SEC staff, and is probably well-founded. Yet that conclusion seems to be based primarily upon the administrators' experienced "feel" for
their subject as no available studies indicate how effectively the compliance benefits
of the no-action process have reached into the securities business. Surely the results
of the no-action process do not overwhelmingly favor the applicant-a fact which
"In the period from June 4-December 30, 1968, only xx no-action matters were brought before
the Commission, and in each instance it approved the staff's recommendation that sale be permitted without restriction.
" Panel, Public Information Act And Interpretative And Advisory Ruling, 2o AD. L. Rav. 1, 24 (1967).
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could induce many stockholders and brokers to take their chances rather than draw
regulatory attention to a proposed transaction.
Earlier discussion suggests that the Division's liberal advisory practices, together
with very real disciplinary threats and, until recently, the absence of dependable or
helpful case law, have produced a heavy demand for no-action letters and may continue to produce that demand. But no studies indicate how extensively the educational effects of the advisory processes have pervaded the industry. Discussions
with NASD personnel suggest that understanding among dealers may be limited
to the view that stock with a restrictive legend may not be sold without a no-action
clearance. There may be general understanding of the obligation to investigate
"control" persons, but it is likely that most registered representatives make little or
no effort at investigation unless they are independently aware of a seller's controlling status. And there may be little or no understanding of the need to determine
whether a holder of unlegended stock may have obtained that stock from a controlling person. In any event, it is clear that nothing in the NASD training program
for registered representatives deals adequately with these problems; and there is
nothing in the exams for either principals or registered representatives dealing with
them. 74
There are no studies to indicate the extent of actual compliance where the staff
refuses to take a no-action position. It may be inferred that most stockholders would
comply. And those who understand the securities laws should, of course, be aware
that a sale following the staff's refusal could provide the basis for a charge of willful
violation. But neither studies nor enforcement programs have focussed upon the
effect of a staff refusal, and all conclusions in this area must be based on inference.
Enforcement personnel generally regard no-action letters as an important part
of the compliance program. Copies of all no-action letters are sent to the Regional
(enforcement) Office nearest the city in which the proposed transaction would
occur. But compliance programs are not based upon follow-up of staff refusals of
no-action positions, and very few enforcement proceedings arise in that manner.
Rather, no-action letters enable enforcement personnel in the Regional Offices to
keep up with what is happening with particular companies and in the business
generally and with the staff's thinking on particular interpretive and enforcement
problems. Occasionally a letter may prompt enforcement personnel to object to a
specific staff position, particularly if the same or similar transactions are under investigation in the field. To those ends, the letters are circulated among the senior
personnel in the Regional Offices.
Where an investigation or enforcement proceeding is already underway, the noaction process is administered to minimize the probability of any further illegal
" See NAIOzNAL

AssocIATIoN

oF SEcuiuTS DRALmS,

NASD

TPRANING GusDE

(1969); Interview

with Mr. Lloyd Derrickson, then General Counsel, National Association of Securities Dealers and NASD
personnel responsible for training programs. But see note 44, supra.
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distributions that might prove damaging to purchasing stockholders. Thus, the
processing of no-action letters routinely involves a file check to determine the
pendency of any investigations. Typically, where an investigation is pending, the
staff will refuse to take a no-action position via a written response that is almost
totally uncommunicative. (See Appendix B, paragraph A.)
Thus, it appears that the primary compliance benefits of the advisory process are
in educating the industry for, and encouraging, voluntary compliance. It remains
to be demonstrated that an unconstrained advisory process, providing routine
clearances for sales, is the best means of achieving that end. The Commission
apparently concluded that it was not, in deciding to limit the availability of no5
action letters after the effective date of Rule 44.
VII
No-ACTiON LETIERs As NONPUBLIC PUBLC LAW
In considering the status of no-action letters as "law," three different products
of the no-action process should be segregated: (a) Commission "orders" determining an applicant's entitlement to a no-action letter, together with the related
no-action response, staff memoranda to the Commission, and any interpretive summaries reflecting the result; (b) no-action letters which, though not reviewed
by the Commission, provide the basis for internally-distributed interpretive summaries; and (c) other no-action letters rendered by the staff which are neither
reviewed by the Commission nor summarized for internal distribution.
The Commission-reviewed no-action positions and accompanying statements
would seem, from counsel's perspective, to constitute "law," for they involve a final
official disposition of a concrete claim not unlike the mass of case law on which
lawyers commonly rely for guidance.. Surely such determinations are "orders"
within the meaning of section 2(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act, for the
agency renders "a final disposition . . .declaratory in form . . .in a matter other
than rule making but including licensing."'' 6 And such orders may well constitute a
"license" within the broad language of section 2(e) for in reality they constitute a
"form of permission." Furthermore, the staff and Commission appear to treat prior
Commission-approved no-action dispositions as precedent. Throughout the supporting memoranda there are frequent citations to the precedents found in prior
no-action dispositions, with many general citations and frequent specific citations.
Thus, in the forty-five no-action dispositions by the Commission between to May
1967 and 14 May 1968, there were at least fourteen specific citations to prior
17
Commission-approved no-action dispositions.
See note 53 supra, and accompanying text.
Cf. Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), judgment vacated as
C6
moot, 401 U.S. 973, 40 L.W. 4117 (I972). But see First Savings & Loan Ass'n of the Bahamas, Ltd.
v. SEC, 358 F.2d 358 (5th Cir, x966); Mattson v. Medical Development Corp. v. SEC, 329 F. Supp. 304
(D. Utah 1971).

"'See summary of staff citations to no-action dispositions compiled in App. G of Rv'oitT, supra note
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In considering the Commission dispositions as "law," it is important to recognize
that they assume that status because they reflect Commission action and not because
they are interpretive or analytical in form. The Commission minutes ordinarily do
not reflect the Commission's reasons for its conclusions in particular no-action
matters, and the reasons must be inferred from the facts, interpretations, and discretionary considerations set forth in the accompanying staff memoranda. While
the Commission actions would seem to involve "interpretations," there is no assurance
that that is the case, for often they may also reflect such other concerns as the
hardship imposed by compelling rigid compliance with registration requirements,
an assessment of the "quality" of the company and the probability of injury to a
purchasing stockholder if the proposed sales are made, and similar "discretionary"
considerations 7
The same considerations affect the interpretive understanding to be gleaned from
no-action letters except those very few that are, in form, expressly interpretive. The
former Chief Counsel of the Division of Corporation Finance has commented:
I do not believe it is helpful . . . to attempt to make a distinction between noaction and interpretive letters .... By far the more numerous are those situations
in which it is difficult, if not impossible, to tell whether the staff advice is intended
as an interpretation, or merely as a statement that enforcement action will not be
taken.... It is difficult for the reader to make a distinction between the two types
of letters because of the rather peculiar phraseology ... but more importantly because it is impossible for the reader to know what factors were, in the mind of the
staff member who wrote the letter, determinative of the position taken.... Also, it
is not always clear to the staff member whether he intends that the letter constitute
an interpretation or merely a statement that enforcement action will not be
taken. . . . It was my experience that normally when a request for advice was
referred to the Commission ... [it] considered the question as one of interpretation of the securities laws. This was true even though the person who had
requested the advice may have desired nothing more than an assurance that no
enforcement action would be instituted.... Conversely, in some instances when
the staff referred matters to the Commission as interpretive questions, the Commission disposed of them as if they were nothing more than requests for assurance
79
that no enforcement action would be instituted.
The uncertainty created by the interaction of legal interpretation and discretionary
enforcement policy necessitates careful appraisal of the statements of Commission
and staff in order to reach a judgment about their interpretations or policies. But
uncertainty about the motivations for official decisions is a problem that lawyers
must continually puzzle from their days as first-year law students. That uncertainty
3. See the frequent citations to the authority of previous no-action positions in the memorandum supporting the staff position set forth in App. L-x of REPoRT, supra note 3. (This latter action is described
in App. B, A, infra.)
"'See letter of George P. Michaely, Jr., former Chief Counsel, SEC Division of Corporation Finance,
App. B. of RmoRer, supra note 3.
0oid.
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renders the "no-action" decision no less "law," whether rendered by the Commission
or by the staff.
Whether the staff interpretations, as reflected either in the original no-action
letters or in those letters taken together with related interpretive summaries, are
"law" must depend upon the purpose for which that question is asked. For example,
it seems likely that the summaries of interpretation, together with the applicable
no-action letters, may well be viewed as "instructions to staff that affect any member of the public" within the meaning of the Public Information Act."0
There can be little doubt that the interpretive summaries, whether based upon a
Commission disposition or upon an unreviewed staff letter, provide a body of internal precedents which "affect" members of the public who request no-action letters.
The senior staff counsel regard it as their function to maintain internal consistency in
rendering no-action letters, and to that end the staff attorneys are urged to view
the problems presented by no-action requests as legal questions to be resolved by
traditional legal, interpretive techniques. The entire process of summarizing and
circulating interpretive statements and maintaining a card file of interpretations
can only be intended for that purpose. Thus, the senior Assistant states that he particularly expects the newer staff attorneys to "spend a lot of time in the cards," and
he discourages them from basing their recommended decisions on "discretionary"
factors.
Of course it is essential to recognize that both the senior counsel and the staff
attorneys are agreed that a large proportion of the routine no-action letters are not
of precedential value s l In large part this is due to the routine nature of the
questions usually presented, which also results in the relatively low staff use of
the internal -research tools. But use of the research tools continues at a rate roughly
comparable to that proportion of cases in which the staff attorneys find their
experience inadequate for preparation of a no-action response.8 2
Another factor of importance which contributes to the view that many no-action
matters are not of precedential importance is the widely held staff position that
many no-action matters reflect only conclusions of "ultimate fact" peculiar to the
facts of a particular case. Thus, the practice has developed of treating most "change
of circumstance" claims as single unique cases without precedential value. Yet certain

patterns of decision are surely reflected in those cases. For example, it seems likely
that the worsening of a medical condition that existed at the time of purchase of

the stock in question will not support a claim of "changed circumstances," though such
a claim may be based upon a new medical condition that arises after purchase of
the stock. But if the medical condition, though it subsisted at the time of purchase,

so 5 U.S.C.A.

§ 552(a) (2) (C) (x967).
" Questionnaire responses indicate about 7% are of precedential value. Questionnaire, supra note 6o,

question 26.
82See text at note 67, supra. Note that the use of available research tools continues at a rate

roughly comparable to that proportion of cases in which the staff attorneys find their experience inadequate for preparation of no-action responses.
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has grown worse, when the prognosis was that it would improve, sale may be
authorized-at least, where no substantial distribution is involved. Similarly, claims
of changed circumstances resulting from termination of employment are often
rejected. But a recent elaboration of that position resulted in the conclusion that
if the applicant can support his claim with a showing that he had a written, unqualified employment contract for a specific term, he may be successful.
While all of these applications of the "change of circumstances" concept may
have been affected by the presence of other "discretionary" considerations, such concrete interpretive examples are helpful to staff counsel precisely because they indicate the quality of the "change" currently viewed as sufficient by the Assistant
Chief Counsel. And probably for that reason, the more important research tools
relied upon by the staff counsel are their own copies of previous no-action letters
and consultation with their colleagues. s
The effect of discretionary considerations upon ostensible "interpretations" is
not to be discounted, however. A good example is found in the no-action matter
considered by the Commission in Appendix B, paragraph C, and reported on a
summary card. The summary card reflecting this action is marked "card only"
because it is considered too unique--as a "change of circumstance" matter-to be
included in the summaries distributed monthly to the staff counsel. The card provides an interpretation of the Commission decision which appears to demonstrate that
the Commission routinely found no "changes" of circumstance that could not have
been anticipated by the stockholder at the time of his purchase. But the card
also recognizes at least one of the typical "discretionary" types of considerations that
affect judgment in noting that the applicant's investment intent was compromised
by the fact that he had made earlier repeated attempts to obtain a no-action letter.
Furthermore, yet another "discretionary" consideration is found in examining the
staff's supporting memorandum to the Commission, though the card indicates
nothing about it. That memorandum shows that one of the applicants had been
counsel for the president of the issuer and that he was currently under investigation
and was thought to have been aware of the president's illegal activities. On that
account, one of the Regional Offices had indicated that, under the circumstances, a
no-action letter should not be granted. While it is uncertain what effect such additional considerations may have had on the outcome in this instance, availability of
that information is helpful to a full appraisal of the Commission action in denying
the application, and in that sense is a part of the "law" of the case.
Another aspect of the file of interpretive summaries which may render it unreliable as a basis for determining current interpretive positions is the fact that it
includes an historical accumulation of cards reflecting positions taken at various
times in the past, many of which may have been superseded by new positions also
"See

note 66, supra, and accompanying text.
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summarized in the cards. Informed researchers approach the cards with caution,
frequently consulting one of the Assistants on apparent conflicts of position. That
movement and conflict, however, do not diminish the status of no-action and interpretive positions as law; as with most legal sources, it merely requires thorough
research to discern current positions and to resolve conflicting positions.
Finally, the inadequacy of many no-action letters as guides to interpretation is
illustrated by comparing the no-action matters summarized in Appendix B, paragraph F: the staff simply offers no explanation for conflicting results in circumstances that appear substantially identical.
VIII
TIrE ROLE OF DisCRaEION

As suggested above, the body of law found in the staff and Commission interpretive positions may be heavily influenced by various discretionary considerations
that are brought to bear on specific no-action determinations. Those discretionary
factors, together with the ad hoc nature of many "fact" determinations, have created
a body of interpretive law in which "uncertainty and divergence of practice presently
prevail to an unacceptable degree." 4
While many discretionary considerations undoubtedly contribute to the uncertainty, others reflect staff efforts to provide means of protecting investors within
a clumsy statutory and interpretive structure. Many of the concepts and distinctions
required by currently-accepted interpretations of the 1933 Act have no real relevance
to the protection of investors. The Disclosure Study commented:
The most casual inquiry into the effects of prevailing interpretative pattern discloses its grave shortcomings .... Sale without registration may turn on events
wholly unconnected with the needs of investors....
An obvious question may be asked: in what possible way is . .. "change of circumstances" relevant to the needs of public investors, so as to justify the sale of
.. .shares without appropriate disclosure? The easy answer to the question is
"none."
In application, the present "fungibility concept" bears little relationship to the needs
of investors for disclosure. It has never been formalized as a Commission rule
or interpretative release, and hence introduces an additional element of uncertainty
into an already clouded situation,

It is apparent from the Disclosure Study discussion of these problems that many
interpretive positions were taken and many discretionary factors taken into account,
in order to prevent the formal structure of registration from choking off legitimate
84
Discos=mE
8

"DisostRE

STUDY at 152.

STuy at 155-56, 17o, and 174.
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securities transactions intended to be exempted from the Act. The framework of
subjective "ultimate fact" judgments provided the flexibility necessary to reach
doubtful distributions, while permitting sales which appeared to be prompted by
the financial needs of an innocent shareholder. But focusing on such subjective considerations often made confident judgment impossible precisely because theory
focussed upon shareholder's motivations.
It is little wonder that under such circumstances, often involving a determination
which might as well be decided by a flip of the coin, various other factors more
obviously pertinent to the protection of shareholders should be taken into account.
Many of those factors, mentioned at various times in discussion with staff personnel,
were listed in responses to the questionnaire submitted to staff attorneys together
with appraisals of their relative importance. The frequency with which such
discretionary considerations were instrumental in decision is reported to be between
86
37 and and 45 per cent.
There have been occasional suggestions that political factors play a large role
in obtaining a favorable no-action response from the staff or Commission. And in
at least one instance, available records seem to reflect "political" considerations. (See
Appendix B, paragraph B.) But a careful analysis of many cases in which congressmen made written "status" inquiries with the Commission failed to demonstrate
any substantial effect, except possibly a more prompt review of the matter and the
preparation of an explanatory memorandum for the congressman.
Undoubtedly the most signifiant "discretionary" factor that plays a role in the
outcome of no-action requests is the pendency of an investigation or an enforcement
proceeding. Where a Regional Office or the Division of Trading and Markets indicates that a "hold" should be placed on no-action letters concerning stock of a
particular issuer, a no-action request ordinarily will be met by a simple uncommunicative rejection. That practice seems often to be followed regardless of whether
the immediate applicant appears to be involved in the potential proceedings.8 7 And
it also seems that the staff is much more reluctant to authorize a no-action position
for the benefit of a stockholder who has previously been found to be a securities
violator.
Various other "discretionary" considerations which appear to play a part in
decision reflect a desire to assure protection of the investor. Thus, particularly in close
cases, the staff is more likely to look favorably on proposed sales of stock of a
reporting company, or of the same class as that recently registered by the issuer, or
sales which are within the ordinary trading volume of the stock in question. A
variety of other discretionary considerations and their effect upon particular noaction requests are summarized in Appendix B.
so Questionnaire, supra note 6o, questions
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14.

B See SEC "No-Action" Letters: Some Problems and Suggested Approaches, 71 COLI M. L. RPEv.
1270 (1971).

1256,

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

IX
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The no-action process as administered by the Division of Corporation Finance

appears to be a sophisticated and effective system of providing informed and specific
staff advice under active agency supervision. The basic conclusion of the Task Force
On Legal Services and Procedure, Second Hoover Commission, appears to remain
sound:
By practice and precedent, letters of advice and staff opinions are given limited
validity . . . [by several agencies.] This excellent practice in administrative pro-

cedure has been most effectively used by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
which issues several thousand such opinion letters annually . . . . The satisfactory experience of agencies which have.., followed the practice... suggests
the advisability of a more general use of the advisory opinion by all agencies of
the executive branch.88

That accolade is justly cited with pride by Division personnel; and the accessibility
and pragmatism of Division personnel, as reflected in the no-action process, is an
outstanding example of an agency making government work effectively within the
inevitably rigid confines of governing statutes. By exercising discretion to modify
statutory rigidity and grant advisory assurance concerning enforcement intentions,
,the staff and Commission enable businessmen, in compliance with law, to execute
legitimate securities transactions, while restraining transactions that may appear
to offend the basic policy objectives of the 1933 Act. But as the demand for advisory
assistance grew, the emphasis on accessability and service to the industry began to
overshadow the major objectives of the advisory processes.
The major objectives of the no-action advisory processes are set forth as follows
in a Division memorandum:
The no-action letter procedure is used to assist persons to comply with the
law in prospective transactions, to discourage unlawful transactions, and to assist
in effectuating transactions that do not appear to be contrary to the intent of the
statutes and rules 89

To this statement of objectives should be added the further objectives of "advising
the staff in advance of activities that might be questionable,"9" and encouraging a
flow of information about financial and regulatory problems to assist the staff and
Commission in developing, elaborating, and testing concepts and policies for current
;and future application.
The former policy of granting advisory clearances for specific transactions, in8
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cluding a mass of routine transactions, appeared to operate on the implicit assumption that the best way to "assist persons to comply with the law in prospective transactions" was to run a clearinghouse for those transactions. That "clearinghouse"
concept of the staff's advisory role consumed the time of some of the best-informed
and most experienced attorneys in the Division of Corporation Finance and seriously
interfered with their effectiveness in exploring new regulatory problems and developing sound interpretative positions and rules. While experience with some problems
presented for advisory assistance can add to the staff's insight, the bulk of the noaction problems heretofore considered by the staff involved routine questions, unrewarding for development of policies or interpretations.
Recognizing that its objectives will be better served by a broadened public understanding of staff and Commission interpretations and policies, the Commission
has sought, by Rule 144, to clarify the restrictions on secondary sales9 ' and has made
publicly available its no-action and interpretive letters? 2 Some interpretative problems in the application of Rule 144 will remain, of course; and there will be continuing requests for no-action letters in areas beyond the scope of the Rule. 3 Nevertheless, these developments substantially expand public access to Commission policies
and interpretations, while promising the staff a reduced burden of no-action requests.
Additional Commission action along the lines begun in the release announcing
Rule 144 could further reduce the burden of routine no-action or interpretative letters,
leaving the staff more time for considered responses to inquiries presenting new or
unique fact situations or interpretative problems. In order to derive maximum benefit
from the public availability of no-action requests and responses, the Commission
should encourage the staff to include in the public materials an adequate statement
of facts and reasons.94 Where inquiries present matters fully covered by available
interpretative materials, the staff should be encouraged to respond with a form
letter or to decline any substantive response. And vhare 'ontinued administration
of routine no-action requests is prompted by doubt about the reliability of the
advice of private counsel, 5 the Commission should develop and adopt rules of
0 Release 5223, supra note 6.

a Release 5o98, supra note 48. Provision has not yet been made to comply with the recommendation

of the Report that public availability should extend to agency minutes and monthly interpretative summaries, interpretative staff memoranda "and all such statements by the staff which are of significant im" REPORT, supra'note 3 at 49o. Btt the importance of making
portance as a guide to interpretation ..
available systematic statements of the staff's interpretive positions has again been emphasized in the recent
study of enforcement policy instituted by the Commission.
ON ENFOReMENT PoLacis AND PRAcscEs, at 17 (1972).

SEC, REPORT o5 THE AivisoRY CoMMITrEE

".Although the bulk of no-action letters relate to questions that Rule 44, attempts to resolve,
examination of representative samples of the summaries of interpretations distributed monthly among the
staff of the Division indicates that more than half of the no-action letters sumnarnzed deal with other
problems.
"' Inclusion of a statement of facts and reasons will also provide the applicant with an understanding
of the factual and legal issues posed by his request, which is not assured by the existing procedures for
processing no-action requests. See pages 113-14, supra. Where additional underitanding suggests the
pertinence of additional available facts, the applicant can request reconsideration.
55
See note 47, supra and accompanying text.
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practice which will permit greater reliance on counsel by discouraging rendition
of opinions on the basis of inadequate legal or factual investigation or in disregard
of available interpretative positions.
The no-action process has been administered by the SEC staff with an unnecessarily broad conception of its discretionary power to grant or deny clearance.
While the area of broadest discretion will be significantly narrowed by Rule x44,
a more fundamental approach to the problem of unnecessary discretion is required.
The key to that approach is adoption of a new policy respecting public disclosure
of the agency's operating interpretations, standards, and policies. That new policy
should assure the public availability of those positions, at least on a tentative basis,
when they are first applied in no-action or other informal proceedings, rather
than awaiting definitive development and formal pronouncement. It should encourage public statements of those operating interpretations, standards, and policies
in as much generality as their current and projected applications permit, going well
beyond conclusory "no-action" determinations wherever possible: Where general
statements are not feasible, hypotheticals may be used to illustrate the application
of narrower interpretative positions." And where discretionary factors are commonly considered in ameliorating or stiffening the informal application of established interpretations, standards, or policies, a list of those factors should be made
publicly available with a general explanation of their pertinence to the informal
determination and, where feasible, of their specific application.
Obviously, these recommendations raise issues about the control of discretion
which go well beyond die no-action process. How much room should there be
for discretionary staff judgments to temper the rigid limitations of law and
established interpretations? Should that discretion be exercised openly with full
public disclosure and the attendant risk of compromising the authority or enforceability of the law? 97 Should it be exercised in secret with the attendant risks of
discriminatory and abusive manipulation of power? Will open exercise of discretion produce demands for consistency which reduce the administrator's willingness to exercise needed and available discretion? Are there legal or administrative
devices which will permit administrators to maintain the authority and enforceability
of the law despite open exercise of discretion?
The recommendation that the thinking of the staff and Commission respecting
interpretations, standards, policies, or discretionary factors be fully disclosed does not
imply any illusions about the difficulty of the above questions. Rather, it is based
on the assumption that pragmatic resolution of these problems can be achieved
and that full disclosure will produce greater compliance benefits, as well as greater
oNARY Jusr c 62 (x969).
For a statement of the need for a wide and uncertain range of administrative discretion in order
to prevent "imaginative fraud" in the field of securities regulation "where publicly stated rules are one
of the instruments of fraud.. . ," see Mason, Administratiue Law-Reality or Red Tape, 40 REV. Jua.
98 K. DAvis, Disce
9

U.P.R. 91 (X971).

No-ACTIoN LErnms

131

fairness, than retention of an uncertain and unneeded range of discretion. As Professor Davis has demonstrated, we have too long operated on the opposite assumption.
APPENDIX A: TYPICAL FORMATS OF SEC NO-ACTION RESPONSES
"Based on the facts presented, we are not able to conclude that the sale of
shares of
Corporation to the public at this time would be exempt from the
registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933."
"On the basis of the facts submitted, this Division will not recommend any
Corporation
action to the Commission, if - sells the - shares of
without compliance with the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.
"Based on the facts presented, this Division is unable to conclude that the
shares of
Corporation may be sold by
- without complying
with the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933"'
"Based upon the facts presented and particularly in view of the short holding
period by the present owner and preceding owner, and the medical circumstances
that arose before the purchase of the shares, this Division is unable to conclude that
the shares which your client owns may be sold without compliance with the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or Regulation A, if
available."
2S
"Based on the facts presented, including counsel's opinion that Mr.
continued need for medical attention is a new and unanticipated circumstance, although an exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of
1933 is not free from doubt, in view of the small amount of your client's holdings,
this Division will not Tecommend any action to the Commission if the - shares
of
Corporation stock are sold without compliance with such requirements."
"Based on the facts presented, this Division will not recommend any action
to the Commission if your client sells the shares in question without prior compliance
with the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 in reliance upon
your opinion as counsel that the proposed transaction is exempt therefrom."
"Based upon the above facts, as more fully set forth in your (counsel's) letter,
we are unable to concur in your opinion. Accordingly, no public offer or sale of the
shares of X Company by Mr. B should be made without compliance with the
registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933."
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APPENDIX B: SUMMARY OF DISCRETIONARY FACTORS CONSIDERED
IN PARTICULAR NO-ACTION MATTERS
The following summaries reflect discretionary considerations taken into account
by the staff or Commission in making particular no-action determinations. It is not
feasible to provide detailed explanations of the particular cases, but detailed statements by the staff or Commission explaining the particular determinations are set
forth in Appendices L-i through L-io to the Report, supra note 3. Those statements
are relied upon and cited here as the source of the particular case in which the
various discretionary factors were considered.
A. Refusal of No-Action Position Where Administrative or Enforcement Proceedings Are Pending (Appendix L-2)
In this instance, the applicant had held the stock in question for what would
ordinarily be an adequate "holding period" before seeking permission to sell. With
respect to the interpretation by which he sought to justify his sale, the Division
expressly agreed that his "conclusion of law is correct." But because the Division of
Trading and Markets suggested that the issuing company may be merely a shell, that
some of the promoters of the company had been involved in prior securities violations, and that the applicant had served the company as counsel, a no-action letter
was denied. In this case, after receiving three responses from the staff that were
totally uncommunicative about -the reasons for the denial, the applicant threatened
to make a sale of a portion of his holdings and to invite Commission enforcement
personnel to witness the sale. (See also the staff memorandum in Appendix L-T,
Report, supra note 3, at n. 3, indicating that a no-action position was denied in a
previous matter because '!the Division of Trading and Markets was at that time
conducting an informal market quiz to determine the causes for a price rise in
the company's stock ...

B. Extensive Losses by Large Employer, With Resulting Prospect of Reducing
Employment and Intervention by Commerce Department (Appendices L-3
and L-4 )
This involves comparison of two similar matters, which should be considered
together, The first matter demonstrates a routine denial of a request based upon a
claimed "change of circumstances" arising out of pressing financial and business circumstances. The staff generally views such circumstances as ordinary financial
risks wIhich the stockholder should have anticipated.
Similar considerations might have produced a similar result in the second matter
(Appendix L-4 ). Indeed, the staff memorandum so recommends because an accident and engineering difficulties put the applicant behind schedule in developing
a prototype and created his claimed "change of circumstances" requiring additional
capital. In the staff's view, those contingencies would reasonably be expected as a
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part of the risks of developing a prototype. But the Commission was obviously
swayed by the extent of the losses involved, by the possible increase in local unemployment that would result from discharge of the applicant's many employees, or
by the intervention of administration officials pressing the latter argument. This
no-action matter does not appear to have been made the subject of an interpretive
summary.
C. "Investment Intent" Compromised by Premature Attempts to Obtain NoAction Letter (Appendix L-5)
In this matter, the interpretive summary card expressly asserts and relies on the
view that early and repeated attempts to obtain a no-action letter may compromise
any claim of original investment intent. Further, though not reflected on the summary, it demonstrates that enforcement considerations may play a part in decisionin this case, the pendency of an investigation of the issuer and the applicant's possible
involvement in the matter under investigation. For that reason, it leaves some
doubt whether the interpretive summary reflects all of the reasons for -theresult.
D. Refusal of No-Action PositionBased On Internally-AdoptedRules (Appendices
L-i and LS)
One no-action request (in Appendix L-i) proposes a sale of stock acquired on
warrants by an underwriter of an issuer's earlier registered distribution. Although
alternative reasons for denial are offered, one substantial explanation appears to be
the staff's development of a presumption that warrants received by underwriters in
connection with an earlier distribution are invariably taken for sale and not for
investment. Here, the underwriter-applicant appears to have held the stock for more
than three years, after holding the warrants for a year and a half-more than adequate
to satisfy the usual holding period applied in other no-action cases. The staff, however, contends that where warrants have been issued as additional underwriting
compensation, stock acquired on the exercise of those warrants must be presumed
to have been acquired for sale rather than investment.
A similar hard-and-fast but unpublished rule is reflected in Commission action
on the second matter (in Appendix L-8). This case involved an apparently legitimate
claim on the part of a former member of a controlling family group that family
friction, and his resulting expulsion from any policy-making position in the company,
constituted a "change of circumstances" which could justify sale. Though such
claims had been approved not infrequently, the Commission here disapproves because
of a policy decision to deny no-action letters to all members of controlling family
groups.
E. Conditional Grants of No-Action Letters (Appendix L-io)
Although the practice is not common, the Commission will occasionally extract
a condition as the basis for granting a no-action letter. In this instance, the Corn-
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mission approved a no-action position on the condition that the applicant agree not
to buy a certain class of shares in the future-presumably because of the applicant's
affiliations with those companies. In another instance, a variation on this theme, the
Commission "concluded that, under the special facts here involved, the staff might
take a 'no-action' position after the expiration of two years" from the date on which
the applicant had acquired the stock in question-an authorization to the staff somewhat at odds with the theory that investment intent is proved after an appropriate
holding period. And in a third instance, the Commission rejected a request to sell
692,050 shares, constituting 22.6% of the issuer's outstanding shares, but indicated
that if the applicant and his counsel "of their own volition withdrew that request
and made a new request relating to iooooo shares, it would grant the latter request."
(The latter two examples are drawn from Commission minutes and staff memoranda
made available to the author but not a matter of public record.)
F. Absence of Any Apparent Explanation For Diverse Results in Similar Cases
(Appendices L-6 and L-7)
In these matters, one applicant is permitted to sell 225,000 shares representing
14.5% of the issuer's outstanding stock, the last 75,ooo shares of which were acquired
14V2 months earlier; but the other applicant is denied the right to sell 5,006 shares
(presumably less than 14.50/- of outstanding) which were acquired in an exchange
effective approximately 16 months earlier. Both applications appear to be based
upon a claim of unanticipated discharge from employment, and neither staff letter
includes any explanatory Tationale. While some theories might be elaborated to
explain the difference, no adequate explanation appears on the face of the letters.

